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Abstract In 1999, Scott suggested that evolution has
existential repercussions for some students because they
confuse methodological naturalism with philosophical
naturalism: conflating the incapacity of scientific explan-
ations to appeal to the supernatural with the idea that God
must not exist. Unfortunately, part of the reason for the
confusion involves terms that are used in a technical sense
by evolutionary biologists but that also convey existential
meanings to the general public. Such terms therefore should
be used carefully by teachers, and their scientific meanings
distinguished from their common meanings. We revisit
these problem concepts, particularly in light of recent
papers in cognitive psychology as they relate to under-
standing evolution, in a two-part series of articles. Here, in
part I, we address design and purpose.
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Introduction: Worldviews and Methodological
and Philosophical Naturalism
Students begin a high school or college course in biology
with varied worldviews and opinions that can influence
their acceptance or rejection of evolution. One study of
more than 100,000 first-year college students found that
47% rated themselves either “above average” or in the “top
10% in spirituality” and indicated that 80% believe in God
(Higher Education Research Institute 2005). Cotner et al.
(2010) reported that students with more conservative
religious views show a greater likelihood of endorsing
young-Earth beliefs. Political and cultural differences
correlate with student understanding of evolution. The
more liberal a student’s political views, the more likely he
or she is to acknowledge the great age of the Earth (Cotner
et al. 2010).
Numerous polls indicate that the United States is a nation
with a high percentage of individuals professing belief in
God, compared to other developed nations (see www.
beliefnet.org for comparative data). Numerous polls also
indicate that acceptance of evolution in the United States is
unusually low among developed countries (British Council
2009; Miller et al. 2006). But in terms of general scientific
literacy, compared to other developed nations, the U.S. does
well on some measures, and less well on others (National
Science Board 2008). So science literacy in the U.S. is not
strictly a function of religion, although acceptance of
evolution is probably strongly conditioned by the particular
religious pattern and history of our nation (Scott 2009). To
improve the public understanding of science, more attention
needs to be paid to instruction in the nature of science itself.
Highly relevant to the understanding of evolution is the
distinction between methodological and philosophical (or
ontological) naturalism (Pennock 1999).
Methodological naturalism is the practice in science of
restricting scientific inquiry to natural (or material—matter
and energy) causes. For the purposes and readership of this
journal, rather than for philosophers of science, we briefly
outline the argument for the necessity of methodological
naturalism. Philosophers of science discuss these and other
issues at length, of course, but teachers rarely need to get
into great detail with their students.
The essence of science is testing. To test an explanation
requires that variables be held constant: an experimenter
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has to control the amount of water, and cultivation, and
sunlight to test whether the fertilizer works on the plants.
Only the variables (light, water, weeds) that can be held
constant in this manner can be studied scientifically. A
variable that cannot be held constant cannot be scientifi-
cally tested. Because a supernatural God is unconstrained,
scientists leave God out of scientific explanations—whether
or not they believe in God. This is because any test using
God as a cause has no predictable outcome: any outcome is
possible, so nothing can be learned from such a test. If
the experimenters wanted to test whether God affected the
growth of the plants, how would they ensure that the
experimental group was subject to God’s influence and
isolate the control group from God’s influence? So
scientists are stuck with methodological naturalism, appeal-
ing only to natural causes in explaining natural phenomena.
It works, so we stick with it.
Methodological naturalism is contrastedwith philosophical
naturalism, a worldview—not a scientific methodology—
that contends that matter and energy are all there is: there
is no God, or gods, or supernatural entities of any kind.
This is a long-standing philosophical perspective, going
back at least as far as the ancient Greeks, but it is logically
independent of methodological naturalism or science.
True, it is highly likely that all philosophical naturalists
are also methodological naturalists, but the converse is
neither logically necessary nor empirically true. Many
scientists are theists who, like Gregor Mendel, an
Augustinian monk, restrict themselves only to natural
causes in their scientific work.
This is not a mere digression, but central to the point of
this and its companion article. Many students confuse
methodological and philosophical naturalism, or infer the
latter from the former, reasoning that because it is possible
to explain so much of the natural world through natural
causes (methodological naturalism), it follows that there are
no supernatural entities and (in particular) no God (philo-
sophical naturalism). We believe that this is a misunder-
standing of science that erects unnecessary barriers to the
acceptance of evolution that teachers should be aware of
and which they can mitigate.
Anderson (2006) points out that while biology class-
rooms in public schools are “a place to teach science and
not religion,” ignoring the religious perspectives of students
will not facilitate acceptance of evolution, nor will such
approaches correct misconceptions rooted in a misunder-
standing of the nature of science (Lombrozo et al. 2008).
Sinatra et al. (2008) suggest that “helping people to
understand evolution is not a matter of adding on to their
existing knowledge, but helping them to revise their
previous models of the world to create an entirely new
way of seeing”, specifically challenging default ways of
thinking (Sinatra et al. 2008). Considering these elephants
in the living room, it appears to us that more attention needs
to be paid to some underlying ways of thinking that could
influence the learning of evolution in negative ways. In this
first of a two part series, we start with two concepts:
purpose and design. The follow-up article, to be published
in the next issue of Evolution: Education and Outreach, will
address cause and chance.
Purpose
Children readily take the position that things are made for
a purpose (Keleman 1999), and of course, for many of the
phenomena children encounter, this is not irrational.
Toddlers and elementary schoolchildren are learning the
names of things, and “things” (tools, toys, machines,
clothes, furnishings, etc.) do indeed have a purpose.
Unfortunately, children often conflate living things with
human-made artifacts and classify them in the same way.
Such a teleological constraint hampers future understand-
ing and acceptance of evolution (Sinatra et al. 2008). Even
Darwin recognized that the tendency for humans to
ascribe purpose to living things posed an issue for
understanding his theory, addressing the seemingly pur-
poseful nature of structures in his discussion of “Difficul-
ties on Theory” (Darwin 1859). Darwin, however, went on
to explain in detail how seemingly “purposeful” struc-
tures, such as the placement of pollen and stigmatic
surface of flowers for self-fertilization, evolved through
the retention of slight heritable variations that promoted
survival and reproduction.
Of course, the devil is in the details, and the word
“purpose” is slippery in its range of meanings to people.
Sometimes it is used as a synonym for function, as Darwin
does in the above case, referring to parts of plants.
Sometimes, again in the context of evolution, purpose is
attributed to an internal or external directional force to
evolution. (Sometimes purpose has a more existential
meaning, as in “there is a purpose to the universe”, or
“my life has meaning”—subjects well outside of what
science can comment upon.) The idea of a directional force
in evolution although long-rejected by paleontologists and
other evolutionary biologists, is still pervasive in the public
understanding of evolution. In its crudest form, it can be
seen in the idea that all of evolution has led to a pinnacle—
Homo sapiens! Some of the outmoded iconography of
evolution—e.g., the unilineal evolution of horses from four-
toed browsers to single-toed grazers—provides cases in
point. Such iconography mistakenly assumes an inevitabil-
ity of evolution resulting in a particular result: for example,
an intelligent, tool-using bipedal ape eventually will appear
in the primate lineage, or a one-toed grazing equid in the
horse lineage. Teachers also may believe that “traits appear
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only when they are needed,” a misconception that reflects a
sense of purpose or directionality to evolutionary change
(Nehm and Schonfeld 2007). This sort of purposefulness of
evolution has no basis in science, and is often what
scientists mean to deny when they say, informally, that
“there is no purpose to evolution.”
But teachers well know that what students hear is more
important than what teachers say. To a student, “purpose” is
not likely to mean orthogenesis! Purpose is more likely to
have the connotation of either of the two other meanings:
the everyday, functional meaning (the purpose of my pen or
keyboard is to take notes) or the more existential (and
extrascientific) definition of meaningfulness of life. So it
behooves a scientist to use the term purpose carefully.
When members of the nonscientific public hear a sentence
such as “man is the result of a purposeless and natural
process that did not have him in mind” (Simpson 1967:344)
or that “life developed gradually from nonliving matter to
its present state of diverse complexity through purposeless
natural mechanisms that are known to science” (Johnson
1990:33), they are led toward believing that evolution is not
merely non-orthogenetic, but purposeless in a religious or
philosophical sense—and therefore inherently antireligious.
What they hear is “God had nothing to do with it,” a
statement that, given the distinction between methodolog-
ical and philosophical naturalism, is outside of science.
It might be retorted that cell division, gene fusion, and
all other scientific topics are no more or less purposeful in
this cosmic sense than evolution. We agree. Yet questions
arise about evolution that don’t arise over cell division, so
teachers and professors should be alert for miscommunica-
tions and avoid even inadvertently reinforcing these barriers
to the public’s acceptance of evolution, which often
bulwark creationist “alternatives” to evolution.
Design
Design and purpose are related concepts, and have some of
the same problems. Both children and adults tend to
attribute design and purpose to nature (Sinatra et al.
2008), and children have cognitive biases towards crea-
tionist explanations (Evans 2000). Researchers find that
people specifically ascribe causation by intentional agents
to nature (Sinatra et al. 2008). Design is the way that a
purpose or a goal is achieved. Such ideas, while articulated
to some extent even by ancient Greek philosophers
(Gregory 2009), are most commonly associated with
William Paley’s biological version of the Argument from
Design. Just as a complex artifact such as a watch is
evidence of the existence of a watchmaker, so is the
intricacy of the natural world evidence of the existence of a
divine designer. The biological version of the Argument
from Design was abandoned after Darwin devised a purely
natural explanation—natural selection—for the fit between
a structure of an organism and the functions it performs.
Yet, despite Darwin (1859) pointing out that reference to
“the plan of creation” or “unity of design” revealed our
ignorance rather than provided an explanation, a natural,
agent-less cause like natural selection is difficult for most
Americans to understand.
Because the nonscientific public readily assumes that
organisms, their components, and other natural phenomena
are not only purposeful, but also are designed and brought
about by an intentional agent, statements that “there is no
design in nature” are easily interpreted to mean “God had
nothing to do with it”, setting up the familiar equation of
evolution with atheism. Because so many American
students are religious, the intelligent design and other
antievolution arguments are automatically appealing.
Scientists, however, use the term design differently.
Because science depends on methodological naturalism, it
does not, and cannot, use the explanation of divine design.
Scientists often speak of a structure having a “design” that
allows an organism to do something or have something
done to it—the shape of an orchid encourages pollination
by a particular species of insect. In this descriptive sense,
all that is meant by a structure’s having a design is that its
parts work together or are put together to get something
done. Hence the purpose of a structure is what it was good
for, whereas the design is how it achieves its purpose. If the
purpose of the vertebrate eye is to allow an organism to
visually perceive its environment, the design of the eye
(lens, ocular muscles, rods, cones, etc.) is how the eye
achieves its purpose (Scott 1999). Philosophers of biology
can (and do) argue about the details, of course, but this
sketch comports well with the bulk of biological practice.
Within evolutionary biology, design can also be used to
indicate a driving force of evolutionary change—not in
response to a designer, or an internal directional force such
as orthogenesis, but in response to directional selection, as
might be found in signal-receiver systems. For example,
Tobias and Seddon (2009) report “signal design” as
evidence of convergent evolution in Hypocnemis antbirds.
Since methodological naturalism does not, and cannot, use
the explanation of divine design, we interpret the use of
design here to refer to natural selection, but—again
distinguishing between methodological and philosophical
naturalism—the ability to explain through a natural cause
such as natural selection is not proof there is no designer.
Such “proof” is outside of science.
Instructors should regularly emphasize to students that
science is limited to natural explanations; whether there is
an ultimate design is beyond scientific test and therefore a
matter for individual student decision. This leaves the door
open for students to make their own choices. The scientific
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community itself is not monolithic regarding religion, of
course. Historically, religious scientists of the late
nineteenth century managed to view natural selection as
a cause of design in living things much as they viewed
gravitation as the cause of the planets staying in their
orbits (Numbers 1998). Direct supernatural cause gave
way to indirect supernatural cause for these religious
scientists. God’s agency was preserved, while science
could proceed in a methodologically naturalistic fashion.
Today, in a survey of biologists, physicists, and chemists
at elite institutions, 33% reported belief in God or a higher
power; the percentage is higher at community colleges
(Ecklund and Scheitle 2007). This means that the
percentage of scientists who believe in God, although
certainly not zero, is likely to be lower than that of the
student body. The percentage of teachers who believe in
God is similar to that of the general public (see for
example Trani 2004).
Conclusion
Some of the problems associated with the understanding of
evolution arise from students’ perceptions that evolution is
inherently irreligious, partly arising from a misunderstand-
ing of the nature of science itself. Professors and teachers
should distinguish between methodological and philosoph-
ical naturalism to decrease the likelihood of students
mistaking the inability to use supernatural causes to provide
scientific explanations of natural phenomena with the
outright rejection of the supernatural. In this first of two
articles, we propose that professors and teachers separate
the scientific usages of design and purpose from the more
existential meanings that these terms evoke in students’
minds. They should make clear to students that the nature
of science says nothing about ultimate purpose, design, and
direction of evolution. Science can tell us that the fossil
record and the factors affecting evolution suggest that many
contingencies affect the history of lineages through time,
and that there is no evidence of orthogenesis. But
ultimately, whether there is existential purpose and meaning
or direction to the universe is a matter of philosophy, not
scientific proof. It is also suggested that as educators we
rethink our use of “design”—which implies for many
students that there is a plan at work—and use terms such
as “structure” and “adaptation” where more appropriate.
For example, “How is an aardvark designed to eat ants?”
could be replaced by “How is an aardvark adapted to eating
ants?” or “What structures and behaviors aid an aardvark in
eating ants?” We also suggest, whether teaching adaptation
to elementary school students, evolution to high school
students, or cell biology to college students, we (scientists
and science educators) clarify the use of purpose and
design to be independent of both theistic and atheistic
worldviews.
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